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Do Bulls and Bears Listen to Whispers? 
Janis K. Zaima* and Maretno Agus Harjoto**
 
San Jose State University*, ** and Pepperdine University**
 
Abstract 
A post-earnings announcement drift associated with the market reaction to analyst 
forecasts errors remains a puzzle.  This study suggests that whispers help to explain part 
of the puzzle. The study examines the market reaction to whispers and analysts in bull 
and bear markets, and finds that investors listen to whispers in the bull market and 
whispers help explain the post-announcement drift.  In a bear market, reaction to 
whispers is significantly positive prior to announcement despite a down market, 
indicating optimism by investors who follow whispers.  However, in the bear market, both 
whispers and analysts contribute to the post-announcement drift. 
1. Introduction 
Numerous studies document abnormal stock returns surrounding the earnings 
announcements, but the explanation for the post earnings announcement drift remains a
puzzle.1  Brown (1997) concludes that the post-announcement drift exists separately from 
the P/E effect, size effect, the Value Line effect, and that both the stock prices and
analysts underestimate the persistence of the earnings surprises. Studies by Bernard and 
Thomas (1989) and Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000) focus on the post-
earnings announcement drift and find evidence that unsophisticated (or noninstitutional) 
investors account for the significant abnormal returns after the earnings release. Doukas, 
Kim and Pantzalis (2002, 2004) argue that the abnormal returns of value stocks found 
around the earnings announcement cannot be fully explained by analyst forecast errors. 
They suggest that divergence of opinions among investors plays a role to explain 
abnormal returns around earnings announcements.  Our study adds to the literature by 
suggesting that investors who follow whispers impact stock movement around the
earnings announcement.  We suggest that the abnormal returns surrounding the earnings 
announcement can be explained in part by the market response to whisper forecast errors.   
Earlier studies by Bagnoli, Beneish, and Watts (1999) and Zaima and Harjoto (2005) 
investigate anonymous individual forecasts or whispers surrounding the earnings release.
Bagnoli, et al. document that whispers add to the market expectation beyond the analysts 
forecast.  Zaima and Harjoto (2005) find that if a conflict arises between whisper and 
analyst forecast errors, the market reaction to whispers dominate its response to analysts. 
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Financial Decisions, Summer 2007, Article 2 
Additionally, they create a portfolio that takes a short position when both forecast errors 
are negative, long position when both forecast errors are positive, and use only whispers 
when the two conflict, and find that the portfolio generates a post-announcement three-
day abnormal return of approximately 6.5% to 8.2%.   
These past studies of whispers and analyst forecasts have shown that the two convey 
different information where one does not subsume the other.  To examine the differences
of information contained in the two forecasts, we separate the market reaction to whisper 
and analyst forecasts in the bull and bear markets because expectations might differ in 
optimistic and pessimistic markets.  Moreover, this study contributes to the literature by 
attempting to explain the post-earnings drift.  Hence, we examine two factors:  (1) the 
accuracy of analyst and whisper forecasts during the bull and bear markets and (2) the 
market reaction to whisper and analyst forecast errors during the two markets over the
pre- and post-announcement periods.   
The accuracy of whisper and analyst forecasts may differ because analysts generally
obtain information about firm earnings expectations from management while whispers 
are individual investors’ expectations obtained from various sources including blogs and 
Internet message boards.  Since whispers rely on various sources of information while
analysts receive cues and information from the firms, we expect analyst forecasts to be 
more accurate and whispers to be more divergent.  Furthermore, we examine whether 
individual investors are swayed by market momentum.  In particular, we examine
whether whisper forecast errors are greater than analysts during bull markets and whether 
whispers forecast errors, on average, are less than analysts during bear markets. In order 
to test the accuracy of the forecasts, we compare the scaled forecast errors. We define 
scaled forecast errors for analyst (SFE) and whisper (SWE) as:  
SFE = (Actual EPS – Analyst forecast EPS)/|Actual EPS| (1) 
SWE = (Actual EPS – Whisper forecast EPS)/|Actual EPS| (2) 
Next we analyze the market reaction to individual investor expectations and determine 
whether whisper forecast errors help to explain the post-announcement drift.  We
examine the difference in the market reaction to whisper and analyst forecast errors in the
bull and bear markets before and after announcement.  To test the market response to 
forecast errors, we compare the market reaction during the pre- and post-announcement
period for the following scenarios: 
1) SFE ≥ 0 and SWE ≥ 0 in a bull market; 
2) SFE <0 and SWE <0 in a bull market;  
3) SFE ≥  0 and SWE ≥  0 in a bear market; and 
4) SFE <0 and SWE <0 in a bear market. 
The four scenarios allow us to examine the different expectations conveyed by each 

















                                                 
   
 
  
   
     
 
   
Financial Decisions, Summer 2007, Article 2 
2. Data and Methodology 
2a. Data Collection and Sample 
The actual earnings per share (EPS), the First Call analyst forecasts, and the whisper 
forecasts are manually collected from a web site currently owned and operated by 
WhisperNumber.com.2 A search engine and proprietary software are utilized to examine 
thousands of messages per day on key Internet message boards that gather whisper 
numbers on stocks.  Additional whispers are obtained from web visitors who are 
encouraged to enter their whispers for any stock.  The staff examines the collected 
whispers and discards the “absurd” outliers and obvious duplicates.  The final whisper 
number published on the web site is an equally scaled average of the whispers collected
for that stock. The Nasdaq high technology stocks appear to receive the greatest attention 
as compared to other industries.3   A recent article in Barron’s states, “Contrary to what 
has been reported, WhisperNumber.com doesn’t represent analysts”.4  The whispers 
provided by this web site represent individual investors as opposed to analysts where 
95% of its source is individual investors, and only 5% brokers.5 
Our data collection from WhisperNumber.com spans the period from January 1999 to 
April 2002. Firms are selected based on the news alert provided by the web site. 
Additional firms are randomly selected from a Nasdaq listing in the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) tape. After selecting 140 firms for our firm sample, we collect 
approximately 10 to 12 quarters of First Call analyst forecasts, actual EPS, and whispers
forecasts for 136 firms, resulting in a sample size of 1494 actual EPS and 1463 analyst 
forecasts.6  Not all firms have whispers every quarter, therefore reducing our sample of
whisper numbers to 989. The number of observations for actual EPS, analysts EPS, and 
whisper EPS reduces further due to missing values.  Our final sample consists of 977 
firms-quarters for SWE and 1448 firms-quarters for SFE.7 The stock returns are
extracted from the CRSP tape. 
2 The web site, www.whispernumber.com, has experienced numerous changes in its design and content.





3 The description of whisper numbers data collection process is taken from Louis (2000).  Data from
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Exhibit 1: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms 
This exhibit presents the summary statistics for 136 firms during 1999-2002. All firms’ 
characteristics reported in this exhibit are stated in annually. Total assets, market value 
of equity, net sales, and net income are stated in millions of dollars. Total shares 
outstanding are stated in millions of shares. Sales growth and stock return are stated in 
percent. ROA (return-on-assets) is calculated as net income divided by total assets. The 
stock price is stated in dollars per share. The stock beta is calculated using the capital 
asset pricing model of daily returns in one year. Leverage is calculated as total debt 
divided by total assets. 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Total assets ($ million) 38,989 6,965 98,916 
Market value of equity ($ million) 44,713 15,092 74,983 
Net sales ($ million) 16,450 5,380 27,781 
Net income ($ million) 1,096 255 2,697 
Total shares (million shares) 1,074 424 1,526 
Sales growth (%) 38 13 134 
Stock return (%) 21.32 12.82 103.23 
ROA 0.03 0.05 0.52 
Stock Price ($ per share) 40.51 33.2 43.73 
Beta 1.38 1.26 0.78 
Leverage 0.2 0.17 0.21 
The descriptive statistics in Exhibit 1 provide a summary of financial data for 136 firms
obtained from COMPUSTAT. The mean for total assets is $38.989 billion (median is 
$6.965 billion) and mean market value of equity is $44.713 billion (median is $15.092
billion).  The sample mean reflects large firms (such as IBM, Microsoft, Intel, and 
Cisco), but the lower median implies that most of the firms in the sample are smaller
firms.  Similar results are found for net sales where its mean is $16.450 billion while its 
median is $5.380 billion as well as for net income; its mean is $1.096 billion and the 
median is only $255 million.  The mean number of shares outstanding equals 1.074 
billion while the median equals 424 million shares.  Again these statistics attest to the
higher frequency of smaller firms.   
Firm performance measures also indicate a skewness in the sample.  The mean annual 
stock return is 21.32% while the median is 12.82%.  Sales growth is much larger for the 
mean (38%) compared to the median of 13%. The mean return on assets equals 3% while 
its median is only 5%.  Also the mean stock price is higher ($40.51) than the median 
($33.20). However, the mean and median betas and leverage ratios are closer.  The mean 
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Exhibit 2: Actual Earnings, Forecasts and Forecast Errors During Bull Market 
This exhibit presents the distribution, mean and standard deviation of actual earnings per 
share (EPS), analyst and whispers forecasts, and forecasts errors from the analysts and 
the whispers during bull stock market (January 1999 through March 2000) and bear 
stock market (April 2000 through April 2002). The earnings per share are stated in 
dollars per share. The SFE is the scaled analyst forecast error defined as (actual EPS -
Analyst forecast)/(absolute value of actual EPS).  The SWE is the scaled whisper forecast 
error defined as (actual EPS - Whisper forecast)/(absolute value of actual EPS).
Percentiles
Panel A. Bull Market
SFE SWE 
Panel B. Bear Market 
SFE SWE 
1% -1.08 -3.00 -1.09 -2.00 
5% -0.19 -0.59 -0.19 -0.70 
10% -0.03 -0.25 -0.06 -0.40 
25% 0 -0.09 0 -0.09 
50% 0.04 0 0.03 0 
75% 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.09 
90% 0.25 0.22 0.33 0.25 
95% 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.45 
99% 2.00 0.86 2.00 2.00 
Mean 0.08 -0.13 0.10 -0.02 
Std. Dev. 1.02 1.24 0.96 1.03 
Observations (N) 591 317 857 660 
Wilcoxon H0: SFE = SWE 
Sign-Rank Test: H1: SFE ≠ SWE
Z-test 5.606 Z-test 6.538 
P-value 0.0001 P-value 0.0001 
The summary statistics in Exhibit 2, Panel A, allow us to examine the accuracy of 
whisper and analyst forecast errors in the bull market.  During the boom, the analyst 
forecast errors are very conservative with their median equaled to +0.04 and 75% of the
forecast errors are positive, indicating that forecasts were less than or equaled to the 
actual earnings. The mean of the analyst forecast errors equals +0.08, again supporting 
the conservatism displayed by analysts.  In contrast, the whisper forecast errors during
the bull market exhibits optimism with a mean forecast error of –0.13, indicating
whispers, on average, were greater than actual earnings.  However, the median of whisper 
forecast errors is zero showing that individual investors are relatively unbiased.8 
Together, the two results show that individual investors are generally optimistic, but not 
entirely swayed by market momentum.  Exhibit 2, Panel A, also displays the results of 
the Wilcoxon sign rank statistics testing the null hypothesis that the difference between 
SFE and SWE equals zero. We reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level 
8 The median forecast errors may be forced to equal zero by Whispernumber.com, and may not be a true 
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with z-statistics equaled to 5.61.  This result infers that the analyst and whisper forecast 
errors are statistically different during the boom.  
Exhibit 2, Panel B, presents the forecast errors during the bear market.  During the bust, 
we find that analyst forecast errors are similar to the ones during the boom.  That is, the 
median is +0.03 and 75% of the forecast errors are positive, again indicating analyst 
conservatism in estimating earnings.  Furthermore, the mean of the analyst forecast errors
is +0.10 providing additional support for analyst conservatism.  There is also additional 
evidence of optimism by investors who forecast whispers.  Our analysis rejects the 
conjecture that individual investors are swayed by the downward market momentum as
whispers do not reflect the pessimism of the market.  The mean of SWE equals –0.02 
indicating individual investor forecasts, on average, were higher than actual earnings. 
Although whispers remain optimistic, investors adjust to the general market conditions, 
as mean SWE is much lower during the bust period than the boom (-0.02 versus -0.13). 
So individual investors recognize the change in market conditions and adjust their 
expectations downward. Similar to the boom period, the median for the whisper forecast 
error equals zero indicating an unbiased estimate of firms’ earnings.  The Wilcoxon sign 
rank statistics testing the null hypothesis that the difference between SFE and SWE 
equals zero is rejected. It provides supporting evidence that the difference between 
analyst and whisper forecast errors is statistically different during the bust with a z-
statistic equaled to 6.54. 
In summary, the forecast errors imply that individual investors are more optimistic than 
analysts regardless of the market.  Although whispers remain relatively optimistic during 
the bust, the whisper forecast errors are adjusted downward.  In contrast, the analyst 
forecasts appear to be unaffected by the general market conditions based on the fact that 
75% of the time their forecasts fall below actual earnings.  During the boom the standard 
deviation for whispers and analysts are 1.24 and 1.02, respectively, and during the bust it 
is 1.03 and 0.96 respectively.  The range of SFE during the boom is –1.08 to +2.00 while 
the range for SWE is –3.00 to +0.86.  During the bust, the range for SFE is –1.09 to 
+2.00 and for SWE, it is –2.00 to +2.00.  These results support the conjecture that 
whispers exhibit higher variability reflecting a wider range of market expectations. 
The histogram in Exhibit 3A presents the distribution of scaled forecast errors for 
analysts (SFE) and whispers (SWE) during the boom.  The distribution of SWEs is 
generally more dispersed than the SFEs.  The analyst forecast errors are somewhat 
positively skewed, again, exhibiting analyst conservatism.  In contrast, SWEs are
generally more negative during the boom displaying their optimism.  The histogram of 
the bear market shown in Exhibit 3B, depicts SFE to be slightly more positive, again, 
indicating analysts’ conservatism   During the bust, the whisper forecast errors adjust 
down with the highest frequency at +0.05 although there are numerous occurrences of 
negative SWEs.  These results indicate that whispers adjust their earning expectations
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Exhibit 3A: The Distribution of the Scaled Analyst and Whisper Forecast Errors 

During Bull Market 

This exhibit shows the frequency distribution of the scaled analyst forecast errors (SFE) 
and the scaled whisper forecast errors (SWE) across 136 firms during five quarters of 
January 1999-March 2000 (Bull market). The vertical axis represents the percentage of 














































Exhibit 3B: The Distribution of the Scaled Analyst and Whisper Forecast Errors 
during Bear Market 
This exhibit shows the frequency distribution of the scaled analyst forecast errors (SFE) 
and the scaled whisper forecast errors (SWE) across 136 firms during eight quarters of
April 2000-April 2002 (Bear market). The vertical axis represents the percentage of 
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2b. Event Study Methodology 
We use standard event study methodology to test the market reactions to analyst and 
whisper forecast errors.  The market adjusted abnormal return is calculated by subtracting
the value-weighted CRSP portfolio return from the actual stock return. Average abnormal 
returns (AARs) are obtained by taking a cross-sectional average of abnormal returns for
all firms in the sample for each relative event date.  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
are obtained by summing the AARs over the relative dates, -3 to -1, -2 to -1, -1 to 0, 0 to 
+1, +1 to +1, and +1 to +3, where –3 is defined as three days prior to the earnings 
announcement, 0 is defined as the announcement date, and +3 is defined as three days 
after the announcement date.  We define –3 to –1 and –2 to -1 as the pre-announcement
periods, and +1 to +2 and +1 to +3 as the post-announcement periods.  Day –1 to 0 is
defined as the announcement period. 
Regression analysis is also utilized to test the role of both forecasts and to examine 
whether there is a structural change in the market’s response to whispers and to analysts 
during the bull and bear markets.  A dummy variable is utilized with January 1999 to 
March 2000 defined as the bull market and April 2000 to April 2002 defined as the bear
market.  Regression analysis is conducted over the pre-announcement and post-
announcement periods.  The regression equation incorporates a dummy variable to 
represent the bull and bear markets and interaction terms.  
CARj(T1,T2) = α0 + α1SFE + α2SWE + α3BULL + α4BULLSFE + α5BULLSWE + ej (3) 
where: T1=-2 and T2=-1 for the pre-announcement period and 
T1=+1 and T2=+2 for the post-announcement period 
BULL =  1 if announcement occurred on or before March 2000 
   0 otherwise; 
BULLSFE = SFE if announcement occurred on or before March 2000 
   0 otherwise; 
BULLSWE = SWE if announcement occurred on or before March 2000 
   0 otherwise 
If the slope of SFE (SWE) is significant, we can conclude that analyst (whisper) forecast
errors contribute to the CARs around the earnings announcements.  If the slope
coefficient of BULL is statistically significant, we can deduce that there is a structural 
change in the market response to earnings announcements.  If the coefficient for the 
interaction term BULLSFE is significant, then the correlation between the CAR and SFE 
changes when the market changes from bull  to bear, and if BULLSWE is significant, 
then the correlation between CAR and SWE changes when the market fluctuates from
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3. Empirical Results 
3a. Market Reactions to Actual Earnings Announcements 
First, our samples of analyst forecasts and whispers are split into positive and negative 
forecast errors. Next we divide the four subsamples into two markets, bull and bear,
resulting in a total of eight subsamples.  Finally, we categorize the eight subsamples into 
four scenarios to make a direct comparison between whisper and analyst forecast errors
under each market condition. 
Scenario 1: SFE ≥ 0 and SWE ≥ 0 in a bull market; 

Scenario 2: SFE <0 and SWE <0 in a bull market;  

Scenario 3: SFE ≥ 0 and SWE ≥ 0 in a bear market; and 

Scenario 4: SFE <0 and SWE <0 in a bear market. 

The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in Exhibit 4, Panel A, provides results for 
Scenario 1.  The market reactions to both analyst and whisper forecast errors are similar 
in timing, but different in magnitude.  When actual EPS meets/beats analyst expectations 
(SFE ≥0) the CARs are statistically significant and positive over the pre- and post-
announcement periods.  The CAR(-3,-1) equals 1.39% (4.36) and CAR(-2,-1) is 1.09% 
(4.20) over the pre-announcement period and CAR(-1,0) equals 0.99% (3.81) for the 
announcement date with t-statistics in parenthesis.  The CARs are significant for only two 
days after announcement where CAR(0,+1) is 0.64% (2.47) and CAR(+1,+2) equals 
0.51% (1.96). Similarly, when actual EPS meets/beats the whispers (SWE ≥0) the CARs
are statistically significant and positive over the pre- and post-announcement periods. 
Market reaction to whispers exhibits CARs of 1.10% (2.13) for CAR(-3,-1) and 0.87% 
(2.07) for CAR(-2,-1).  The CAR(-1,0), which is the announcement date, is statistically 
significant and equals 1.84% (4.35). During the post-announcement period, the market 
reaction to whispers exhibit significant CARs over two days, with CAR(0,+1) equaled to 
1.37% (3.24) and CAR(+1,+2) equaled to 1.19% (2.81).  These results suggest that the 
timing of the market reaction to the whispers forecast error is the same as the analysts.
However, the magnitude of CARs is different.  In the bull market, the market response to 
analyst is stronger over the pre-announcement period where CAR(-3,-1) equals 1.39% for 
analysts compared to 1.10% for whispers. Conversely, its reaction to whispers is stronger 
over the post-announcement period where CAR(+1,+2) is 0.51% for analysts and 1.19%
for whispers. Moreover it provides support that investor reaction to whispers contributes 
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Exhibit 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns during Bull and Bear Markets 
This exhibit presents univariate tests of market adjusted cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) between analysts forecast and ahispers. The POSITIVE SFE indicates actual EPS 
meet/beat the analysts forecast and the POSITIVE SWE denotes actual EPS meet/beat the 
whispers. The NEGATIVE SFE represents actual EPS do not meet the analysts forecast 
and the NEGATIVE SWE indicates actual EPS do not meet the whispers. Scenario (1) 
represents the actual earnings meet/beat the whisper or analyst forecasts during the bull 
market. Scenario (2) signifies the actual earnings do not meet the whisper or analyst 
forecasts during the bull market. Scenario (3) implies the actual earnings meet/beat the 
whisper or analyst forecasts during the bear market. Scenario (4) indicates the actual 
earnings do not meet the whisper or analyst forecasts during the bear market. The t-ratio 
is presented in the parenthesis. The *, ** and *** indicate the significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels respectively. 













(-3,-1) 1.39% 1.10% 0.72% 1.19% 
(4.36)*** (2.13)** (0.98) (2.12)* 
(-2,-1) 1.09% 0.87% 0.49% 0.72% 
(4.20)*** (2.07)** (0.81) (1.59) 
(-1,0) 0.99% 1.84% 0.84% 0.80% 
(3.81)*** (4.35)*** (1.40) (1.76)* 
(0,+1) 0.64% 1.37% -0.42% -0.02% 
(2.47)** (3.24)*** (-0.71) (-0.05) 
(+1,+2) 0.51% 1.19% -0.82% -1.97% 
(1.96)** (2.81)*** (-1.37) (-4.31)*** 
(+1,+3) -0.01% 0.54% -0.93% -2.89% 
(-0.05) (1.05) (-1.26) (-5.14)*** 
Panel B. Bear Market 
SCENARIO (3) SCENARIO (4) 
POSITIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE 
SFE SWE SFE SWE 
(-3,-1) 0.85% 0.99% 0.76% 1.39% 
(2.86)*** (2.38)** (1.07) (2.80)*** 
(-2,-1) 0.53% 0.80% 0.51% 0.86% 
(2.20)** (2.35)** (0.89) (2.12)** 
(-1,0) -0.03% 0.38% -0.33% -0.01% 
(-0.16) (1.13) (-0.57) (-0.05) 
(0,+1) 0.00% 0.50% -2.15% -1.63% 
(0.00) (1.49) (-3.69)*** (-4.02)*** 
(+1,+2) 0.14% 0.54% -2.66% -2.30% 
(0.59) (1.58) (-4.56)*** (-5.67)*** 
(+1,+3) 0.61% 0.92% -3.08% -1.97% 


















                                                 
  
Financial Decisions, Summer 2007, Article 2 
Scenario 2 examines the negative forecast errors during the bull market.  When actual 
EPS misses the analyst forecasts, the pre- and post-announcement CARs are not 
statistically significant where CAR(-3,-1) is 0.72% (0.98) and CAR(+1,+2) equals – 
0.82% (-1.37) with t-statistics in parenthesis.  However, when actual EPS falls short of 
whispers the results are noticeably different.  The pre-announcement CARs are 
significant and positive as investors expect good news in a bull market.  The pre-
announcement CAR(-3,-1) equals 1.19% (2.12). The CARs over other subperiods do not 
exhibit statistical significance where CAR(-2,-1) is  0.72% (1.59) and CAR(-1,0) equals 
0.80% (1.76). However, after the bad news is released, the post-announcement CARs are 
significantly negative and equal –1.97% (- 4.31) for CAR(+1,+2) and –2.89% (-5.14) for 
CAR(+1,+3). The results suggest that investors following whispers are more optimistic 
during the bull market indicated by statistically significant positive pre-announcement
returns. The CAR(-3,-1) for whispers equals 1.19% compared to 0.72% for analysts. 
Additionally, whispers react more negatively after the bad news is released with 
CAR(+1,+3) equaled to –2.89% which is statistically significant while the post-
announcement CAR for analyst is –0.93% and not statistically significant.  Although it 
could reflect market correction for the unwarranted positive returns before 
announcement, the market reaction to whispers (not analysts) accounts for the post-
announcement drift.  By and large, the market appears to ignore the negative analyst 
forecast errors during the bull market.
The strong whisper effect during the post-announcement period is consistent with results
found by Bartov et al., Brown, and Doukas, et al.  Bartov et al. conjecture that “the 
trading activity of unsophisticated investors underlies the predictability of stock returns
after earnings announcements” (Bartov et al., 2000, p. 43).  They define unsophisticated 
investors as noninstitutional investors, which is consistent with the group who utilize 
whispers.9 Therefore, investors using whispers explain, in part, the post earnings 
announcement drift.   
Exhibit 4, Panel B, reports the results of Scenario 3 where we examine positive forecast 
errors during the bear market.  The results show that the timing of the market reaction to
both analyst and whisper forecast errors are similar although the size of CARs is slightly 
larger for whispers. When actual EPS meets/beats analyst forecasts the CARs exhibit 
significant positive returns before and after the announcement period.  The subperiod
CARs for analysts equal 0.85% (2.86) over CAR(-3,-1) and 0.61% (2.05) over 
CAR(+1,+3) with t-statistics in parenthesis.  When actual EPS meets/beats whispers,
CARs also exhibit positive significant returns before and after the announcement date.
The cumulative abnormal return for the pre-announcement period, CAR(-3,-1), is 0.99% 
(2.38) and the post-announcement period, CAR(+1,+3), equals 0.92% (2.19).  The CARs
are slightly larger for whispers than analysts over pre- and post-announcement periods. 
However, both forecast errors contribute to the post-announcement drift. 
In Scenario 4, where forecast errors are negative and the market is in a slump, we find the 
market reaction during the post-announcement period for analysts and whispers is similar 
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in timing, but different in magnitude.  When actual EPS are less than the analyst 
forecasts, the CAR results in Exhibit 4, Panel B, report significant negative CARs during 
the post-announcement period (CAR(+1,+2) equals –2.66% (-4.56) and CAR(+1,+3) is – 
3.08% (-4.32)). However, the market reaction to whispers during the pre-announcement
indicate that it anticipates positive news even in a bear market and exhibits positive and 
significant subperiod CARs.  CAR(-3,-1), equals 1.39% (2.80), and CAR(-2,-1) is 0.86% 
(2.12). As soon as the bad news is released, the market reacts negatively with significant 
CAR(0,+1) equal to –1.63% (-4.02). Also post-announcement CARs equal –2.30% (-
5.67) for CAR(+1,+2), and –1.97% (-3.96) for CAR(+1,+3) with t-statistics in 
parenthesis. It provides evidence that the investors following whispers are generally 
more optimistic than ones following the analysts indicated by the smaller negative CARS 
(-1.97% versus –3.08%). However, in the bear market, both forecasts contribute to the 
post-announcement drift. 
Our final analysis examines the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns and 
the analyst and whisper forecast errors as well as a dummy variable to represent the bull 
and bear markets.  
3b. Regression Analysis 
Exhibit 5 shows that SWE is statistically significantly correlated to the pre- and post-
announcement periods while SFE is not.  It implies that SWE is more strongly correlated 
to the market response surrounding the earnings releases than SFE.  Moreover when 
forecast errors are positive (Scenarios 1 and 3), results show that the interaction term, 
BULLSWE, is marginally significant (1.93) in the post-announcement period.  When 
forecast errors are negative (Scenarios 2 and 4), results show that the interaction term, 
BULLSWE, is statistically significant over the pre- and post-announcement periods, but 
BULLSFE is not. It provides evidence that whispers contribute to the pre- and post-
announcement drift and the relationship between CAR and whispers changes when the 
market changes from bull to bear. 
In summary, the regression findings indicate that not only are whispers correlated to 
CARs in the pre- and post-announcement periods, but the relationship between CARs and 
whispers is significantly stronger during the bull, compared to the bear.  The results 
suggest that whispers add to the analyst forecasts to explain the pre- and post-
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Exhibit 5: Regression Analysis Results 
This exhibit presents the regression analyses of two days market adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) prior and after the actual EPS announcements. The columns
utilize regression model: 
CAR(T1,T2)i,t = γ0 + η1SFEi,t + η2SWEi,t + η3BULLSFEi,t + η4BULLSWEi,t + η3BULLi,t + 
υi,t. 
The dependent variables are CAR(-2,-1) and CAR(+1,+2) as defined above.  The 
independent variables are SFE, SWE, a dummy variable, BULL, and two interaction 
terms, BULLSFE and BULLSWE. BULL is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
the period is during the Bull stock market of January 1999 through March 2000, and zero 
otherwise. BULLSFE is an interaction term between BULL and the SFE variable. 
BULLSWE is an interaction term between BULL and the SWE variable. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses.  We also examine the Scholes-Williams excess return using
the value-weighted portfolio (Scholes and Williams, 1977) and the results are similar to 
the results presented below. The *, ** and *** indicate the significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels respectively.  
SCENARIO (1) and (3) SCENARIO (2) and (4) 
CAR(-2,-1) CAR(+1,+2) CAR(-2,-1) CAR(+1,+2)
SFE 0.0040 -0.0077 -0.0025 0.0036 
(1.01) (1.07) (0.67) (0.86) 
SWE 0.0099 0.0135 0.0102 0.0161 
(3.80)*** (2.54)** (3.68)*** (2.51)** 
BULLSFE -0.0011 0.0032 0.0097 0.0133 
(0.21) (0.41) (1.43) (1.72) 
BULLSWE 0.0104 0.0167 0.0113 0.0213 
(1.62) (1.93)* (2.09)** (2.56)** 
BULL 0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0040 -0.0071 
(0.38) (0.19) (0.72) (0.75) 
Intercept 0.0045 -0.0022 0.0087 -0.0139 
(1.75)* (0.51) (2.31)** (2.38)** 
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 
F-ratio 3.87 1.66 10.1 37.24 
p-value (0.0018)*** ( 0.1407) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Observations 860 860 466 466 
4. Conclusions 
Do bulls and bears listen to whispers or analysts?  The whisper forecast errors are more 
optimistic than analysts in both bull and bear markets.  Furthermore the market reacts
more optimistically to whispers than to analysts during the pre-announcement period,
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During the boom, the market reacts more significantly to positive analyst forecast errors
in the pre-announcement period while it reacts more significantly to whispers during the 
post-announcement period.  Moreover, the significant negative CARs for whispers 
indicate that bulls respond to negative whisper forecast errors (SWEs), but they appear to 
ignore the negative analyst forecast errors.   These results imply that negative SWEs 
significantly contribute to the post-announcement drift.   
In a bear market, both positive whisper and analyst forecast errors produce significant 
positive CARs before and after announcements.  When both forecast errors are negative,
bears react significantly only after the earnings release.  However, bears that listen to
whispers appear to be optimistic even in a down market as CARs are marginally 
significant and positive before the bad news is released.  However, when it is released, 
the market reaction to both whispers and analyst is significantly negative during the post-
announcement period.  Therefore, the bears listen to analysts and whispers and both 
affect the post-announcement drift.
In summary, the market reaction to whispers is stronger than to analysts in a bull market, 
implying that investors listen more to whispers during the boom.  However, in the bear 
market there is no distinct difference between the market reactions to analyst forecasts
and whispers. The results suggest that individual investors respond more exuberantly to 
whispers during a market boom, but lose interest when the market is down.  Finally, the 
market response to whispers, in particular, is the main source of market movements 
during the post-announcement period providing evidence that whispers help to explain 
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